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with it. Any subsequent appreciation of
the renminbi–
dollar exchange rate then would be the
bank’s problem; it would not affect the
U.S. business. In three months’time, the
U.S. company would complete the for-
ward transaction, paying the agreed-
upon amount of dollars to the bank and
receiving renminbi from it to complete
the contract with the Chinese firm. 
Unfortunately, many emerging-market
economies, including China, India,
Indonesia, South Korea, the Philippines,
and Taiwan, restrict foreign access to
their currency and on-shore money mar-
kets, making it very difficult—if not
impossible—for foreign firms or interna-
tional investors to hedge in local forward
exchange markets, even when such mar-
kets exist. Local monetary authorities
fear that easy access to on-shore local-
currency loans and deposits, and the
ability to easily transfer local currencies
to nonresidents, encourages speculative
financial movements, greater exchange-
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Since the early 1990s, international
banks have been offering nondeliver-
able forward (NDF) contracts to
clients who need to hedge exposures
in currencies of emerging-market
economies. Many also use the
exchange rate on these contracts as 
a best guess of where the emerging-
market currency is headed. The
exchange rates on NDFs, however,
likely embody a substantial risk 
premium that interferes with fore-
casting accuracy.  
After considerable pressure from the
United States, China revalued the ren-
minbi, 2.1 percent against the dollar, on
July 21 and moved from a pegged to a
managed exchange-rate system. Since
then, the renminbi’s value has remained
around 8.1 per dollar, leading many to
wonder if the recent move is the first in a
near-term series of similar moves or, at
least for now, a one-time event. 
Many look to the forward exchange mar-
ket for a guess about a currency’s future
path. Unfortunately, many emerging-
market economies restrict nonresident
access to on-shore financial markets and,
as a consequence, forward markets either
do not exist or are underdeveloped. Since
the early 1990s, however, some interna-
tional banks have been offering an off-
shore, over-the-counter market in nonde-
liverable forwards (NDFs) for many
emerging-market currencies, including
the Chinese renminbi. 
This Economic Commentary discusses
NDFs and their ability to predict where
a currency is headed, using the Chinese
renminbi as an example. Recently, the
People’s Bank of China—China’s cen-
tral bank—announced that it will permit
more domestic banks to participate in its
forward exchange market, following an
application process that will take about
six months. The goal is to develop on-
shore markets in which firms can hedge
their foreign-exchange exposure. Even-
tually, such a market will probably sup-
plant the NDF market. 
■ The Hedge
Forward markets exist to provide firms
and international investors with a means
of hedging their foreign-exchange 
exposures; any prediction about the
future value of a currency is an ancillary
product of the forward market’s hedging
activity. Firms or investors that have
mismatched cash flows in different cur-
rencies often look to protect themselves
from unforeseen changes in foreign-
exchange rates. Although many methods
exist for doing so, the forward foreign
exchange market, where individuals can
buy and sell foreign currencies for future
delivery at a known rate today, provides
a fairly standard and simple method for
hedging exchange risk. 
To see how this hedge might work,
imagine that a U.S. manufacturing con-
cern contracts with a Chinese firm for
final assembly of its product. As a conse-
quence, the U.S. business might be
obligated to pay the Chinese company a
specific amount of renminbi upon com-
pletion of the job in, say, three months.
Although China is currently keeping the
renminbi near 8.1 to the dollar, the per-
sistent talk about a further renminbi
appreciation has the U.S. firm con-
cerned. An appreciation of the renminbi
would increase the dollar costs of buying
renminbi three months down the road
and could wipe out the company’s
expected profits from the project. 
If the U.S. business had access to the
nascent on-shore forward market, it
could hedge its exchange-rate risk by
contacting a Chinese bank and buying
renminbi today at a known exchange rate
for delivery in three months. The trans-
actions, of course, would not be costless,
and the forward renminbi exchange rate
probably would not equal the current
spot value, but the U.S. manufacturing
firm would know all of the costs up front
and would be able tocalculate the pro-
ject’s likely profits before proceedingrate volatility, and ultimately some loss
of monetary control. Many emerging-
market countries tightened their restric-
tions following the financial crises of
1997 and 1998, giving a further impetus
to an already developing offshore mar-
ket in NDFs. Today, a large and increas-
ingly active market in NDFs exists for
many Latin American, East Asian, and
Eastern European currencies, with cen-
ters in Hong Kong, Singapore, South
Korea, Taiwan, Japan, London (for
Eastern European currencies), and New
York (for Latin American currencies).
Being offshore, this market is out of the
direct jurisdiction of local monetary
authorities. 
Unlike a typical forward transaction,
where delivery of the foreign currency
actually takes place, NDF transactions
are not settled in an emerging-market
currency. They are instead settled in a
convertible currency, typically U.S. dol-
lars.  In this one respect, NDFs are simi-
lar to futures. Commodities, like wheat
or corn, typically trade in organized
futures markets, which provide cover to
commodity dealers. Usually, parties to a
futures contract have no intention of
accepting delivery in the underlying
commodity. Positions are instead settled
in dollars. 
In our renminbi example, the U.S. com-
pany might enter into an NDF contract
to buy a set notional amount of renminbi
at a specific exchange rate in three
months.  Suppose that in the intervening
weeks, China permits a further apprecia-
tion of the renminbi. At the time delivery
is due to the Chinese firm, the U.S. man-
ufacturer would go into the market and
buy renminbi at the now more expensive
exchange rate. All else constant, the 
U.S. business’s expected profits would
be reduced, or might even disappear.
Fortunately, however, under its NDF
contract with a commercial bank, the
manufacturer would receive a cash pay-
ment in dollars directly proportional to
the difference between its contracted
NDF exchange rate and the current spot
rate. This cash payment would amelio-
rate the manufacturer’s loss from its spot 
purchases of renminbi. The NDF thus
provides a hedge against unanticipated
future movements in the exchange rate. 
If instead the Chinese renminbi depreci-
ated—a seemingly unlikely event at pre-
sent—the U.S. manufacturer would be
able to buy renminbi to satisfy its con-
tract with the Chinese firm at a reduced
rate and would realize greater profits
than it initially projected. However, the
U.S. manufacturer would now be
obliged to make a payment in dollars to
the commercial bank holding the NDF
contract. This cash payment would offset
some of the profits in the deal with the
Chinese firm resulting from the ren-
minbi’s depreciation. Although the NDF
reduces some of the profits accruing 
to the U.S. company because of the 
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renminbi depreciation, the NDF pro-
vides more certainty to the firm about
the ultimate return on the project. 
■ The Prediction 
An NDF is a zero-sum game; one side’s
gain is the other side’s loss. Both parties
then have an incentive to minimize their
potential loss (and the other’s gain) by
setting the contract’s exchange rate
equal to the expected future spot
exchange rate. Participants in the mar-
ket, including multinational corpora-
tions, portfolio investors, hedge funds,
and large banks, are sophisticated. 
Presumably, they will use all available
information in forming their expecta-
tions. If, in addition, the NDF market
consists of a large number of buyers and
sellers with ready access to such infor-
mation and funding, the law of large
numbers should guarantee that NDF
exchange-rate quotes are accurate esti-
mates of future spot exchange rates,
with errors that are very small and sym-
metrically distributed around zero. 
This, however, does not seem to be the
case. Figure 1, which is centered on the
previous peg of 8.28 renminbi per dol-
lar, shows the one-, three-, six-, and
twelve-month NDF exchange rates.
Prior to mid-2002, the NDF market
anticipated a depreciation of the ren-
minbi, which never materialized. Since
late 2002 or early 2003, the NDF market
has consistently anticipated—and
missed—an appreciation of the ren-
minbi. Currently, the market seems to
expect that the renminbi will appreciate
an additional 0.8 percent over the next
three months and 4.2 percent over the
next year, but such a precise reading of
these data is premature because it fails
to account for the pricing implications
of risk. 
While foreign exchange participants are
highly efficient processors of informa-
tion, they are also very cautious and seek
compensation for sticking their necks
out. Especially in thin or volatile mar-
kets, dealers embed risk premia into their
forward quotes, which will cause the 
forward exchange rate to deviate from
the currency’s expected future spot
value. These premia adjust with chang-
ing economic circumstances and the
evolving probability of risk. Even though
NDF contracts settle in dollars, the
underlying spot exchange rate—against
whose movements NDF participants 
calculate payoffs—typically is subject to
government restrictions, official inter-Shogo Ishii, Inci Ötker-Robe, and 
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ventions, and large discrete changes,
which impart risk to the market. 
Caution then pervades the pricing of
NDF contracts for Chinese renminbi.
Even if, at any point in time, a renminbi
adjustment—say, a sudden and substan-
tial revaluation from 8.1 per dollar—is
not the most likely prediction for the
foreseeable future, the market price will
nevertheless include compensation for
the small probability of a substantial
renminbi appreciation. The incorpora-
tion of a risk premium for the small
probability of a large adjustment will
cause the NDF rate to deviate persis-
tently on one side of the pegged value as
long as that probability exists. Financial
markets refer to this phenomenon—the
incorporation of a premium for the
small probability of a big, discrete price
change—as the peso problem, after a
similar event during the early 1970s in
the market for Mexican pesos. Because
of the peso problem, the NDF market
suggests the likely direction the ren-
minbi will take, but it is far from precise
about the future level of the exchange
rate or the exact timing of the change. 
■ The Bottom Line
The growing market for NDFs in
emerging-market currencies offers
another example of private financial
institutions’ability to develop instru-
ments for their customers. NDFs pro-
vide private companies and investors a
method of hedging their exchange rate
exposures in situations where local 
governments inhibit nonresident access
to on-shore money markets. While the
rates quoted on NDFs may accurately
reflect the market’s guess of the future
direction for the renminbi, the small
probability of large, discrete changes in
many of these markets makes NDFs
rather inaccurate with respect to the 
timing and the amount of the change. 
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